

1970
YEAR
STAMP

SECUR
N.B. The
UNITARY

Contents checked
for transfer to

D.O.

(Sgt.) *[Signature]*

Date 8/2/71

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. **NEQ** 10/4 (Part 1-59)

TITLE: EXPORT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT &

~~GUIDED MISSILES~~ FROM UK TO IRAQ

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME
(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

Regis

P.H.

n.w.

M. McPherson / M. Simon ^{Doc} _{Doc}

M.W.

Registering

22/12

~~PH.~~

M.W.

29/12

R

ECO

17/1259

Registry Address *[Signature]* 20/12

Room No. 145
Downing Street (W)

must be the same as that of the highest graded
grading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

1970

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO COUNTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART

NEQ 10/4

FILE No.

CYPHER

1

NE

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO STOW U/N OF 16
PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A UNIT 1 TREVITT
NO DISTRIBUTION

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW U/N

TO BAGHDAD
16 JANUARY 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 JAN 1970 NEQ 10/4

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD FOR AIR ATTACHE TELEGRAM NO. STOW U/N OF 16
JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO FOR AIR ATTACHE.

FROM EIR 1 (SHEEN).

STRIKEMASTER FOR IRAQ.

BROWN VISIT ON 18 NOVEMBER.

YOUR LETTER OF 10 NOVEMBER ASSESSED STRIKEMASTER POSSIBILITIES AS POOR. NEVERTHELESS GRATEFUL IF EVERY ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO BROWN ON HIS VISIT. REFERENCE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF YOUR LETTER CANNOT CONFIRM POSITIVELY THAT YUGOSLAV GALEB/JASTREB DEAL WITH IRAQ BUT BELGRADE ADVISED IN EARLY DECEMBER THAT ROLLS ROYCE REPRESENTATIVES THERE HAD RECEIVED ENQUIRY FROM YUGOIMPORT FOR SUPPLY TO SOKO (MOSTA) VIPER ENGINES ON MASSIVE SCALE.

2. SOKO BUILDS GALEB TRAINER AND JASTREB/G/A AIRCRAFT INCORPORATING RESPECTIVELY VIPER V11 AND V500 ENGINES SUPPLIED BY ROLLS ROYCE AND THE LONG TERM ARRANGEMENT. YUGOIMPORT HANDLES MAJORITY OF YUGOSLAV IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

3. ROLLS ROYCE WERE TOLD THAT AIRCRAFT WERE FOR FOUR COUNTRIES WHOSE IDENTITIES WOULD BE DISCLOSED WHEN CONTRACT WAS SIGNED. YUGOIMPORT DID NOT DISSENT WHEN ASKED IF ONE OF THE FOUR WAS U.A.R. AND A CHANCE REMARK LATER SUGGESTED THAT ANOTHER MIGHT BE IRAQ.

4. POSITION UNCHANGED AS OF NOW.

5. AIR ATTACHE CAIRO LETTER OF 14 NOVEMBER ALSO REFERS.

STEWART

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
26 JAN 1970
NEP 10/4

TOP COR / ②
10/4

CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO M O D UK

TELEGRAM NO. OGE 221030Z

22 JANUARY 1970

Mr. Hinchcliffe
Enter. Mr. Stephen
ASD to re. 27/1
26/1

Distributed to
M.O.D. (3) *or this*
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Training & Supply Dept.
Hd. of P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
Military Staff
N.E. & S.E. Dept.
Hd. of Comms. Dept.
Examines
File: Distribution Selectors.
Inform Registrar

RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING FOR MOD UK INFO MINTECH TELNO.

OGE 221030Z JAN

FOR E.4A(RAF) (INFORMATION TO MOD DEFENCE SALES
AND MINTECH EIR).

IRAQI AIR FORCE WISH TO RENEW THEIR ORDER NO 85/AIR/1968 *no trace.*
FOR TOOLS AND SPARES FOR ADEN GUNS. AS THIS ORDER WAS
NOT CONFIRMED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF YOUR LETTER E4A
RAF/7701044 DATED 08 AUG 68 IT WAS AUTOMATICALLY
CANCELLED AND THEIR CHEQUE RETURNED. ARE ITEMS STILL
AVAILABLE? IAF WISH TO PURCHASE ALL AVAILABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF
PRICE. CASH DEPOSIT WILL BE PLACED AS SOON AS YOU INFORM
REQUIRED AMOUNT. GRATEFUL IF YOU SEND *7* LIST OF ITEMS
AND QUANTITIES AVAILABLE, PRICES, DELIVERY DATES AND
AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT SOONEST. ORDER IS SAME AS RECORDED
IN THEIR 85/AIR/1968 DATED 23 JUNE 68. COPY FOLLOWS
BY BAG.

FCO PASS TO MINTECH.

SENT TO D.C.C.

R *MR* BALFOUR PAUL

SENT 1254Z/22 JAN

R()INE BAGHDAD

TO M O D UK

TELEGRAM NO. OGE 221030Z

22 JANUARY 19700

Mr Hinchcliffe
Enter. Mr Stephen
ORSD to me. 27/1
26/1

Distributed to
M.O.D. (3) <i>or this</i>
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Training & Supply Dept
Hd. of P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
Military Staff
<i>N. Eastman</i> Dept.
Hd. of Comms. Dept.
Examines
File: Distribution Selectors.
Inform Registrar

RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING FOR MOD UK INFO MINTECH TELNO.

OGE 221030Z JAN *1*

FOR E.4A(RAF) (INFORMATION TO MOD DEFENCE SALES
AND MINTECH EIR).


IRAQI AIR FORCE WISH TO RENEW THEIR ORDER NO 85/AIR/1968 *No trace.*
FOR TOOLS AND SPARES FOR ADEN GUNS. AS THIS ORDER WAS
NOT CONFIRMED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF YOUR LETTER E4A
*/*RAF/7701044 DATED 08 AUG 68 IT WAS AUTOMATICALLY
CANCELLED AND THEIR CHEQUE RETURNED. ARE ITEMS STILL
AVAILABLE? IAF WISH TO PURCHASE ALL AVAILABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF
PRICE. CASH DEPOSIT WILL BE PLACED AS SOON AS YOU INFORM
REQUIRED AMOUNT. GRATEFUL IF YOU SEND *5* LIST OF ITEMS
AND QUANTITIES AVAILABLE, PRICES, DELIVERY DATES AND
AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT SOONEST. ORDER IS SAME AS RECORDED
IN THEIR 85/AIR/1968 DATED 23 JUNE 68. COPY FOLLOWS
BY BAG.
FCO PASS TO MINTECH.

SENT TO D.C.C.
a for initial

R *Mr* BALFOUR PAUL

SENT 1254Z/22 JAN

RECD 1430Z/22 JAN



CONFIDENTIAL

Regula

Ann (Annals) (3)
File name File he
M. Hinchcliffe 24/1

Neer Eastern Dept.

CYFHER CAT/A

ROUTINE CAIRO TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 7

22 JANUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDS TO MINTECH TELEGRAM NO. STOW 7 DATED 22/1/70 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD.

FOR EIR1A2 AND AIR ATTACHE BAGHDAD FROM BRITAIRAT CAIRO.

STRIKEMASTER.

YOUR STOW NO. 4 (NOTAL).

BROWN AND THORNER WELCOME AND I WILL ASSIST. BUT AS
INDICATED BY LETTER 14TH NOVEMBER 1969 AM STILL NOT SANGUINE
OF ANY REAL INTEREST HERE. NEITHER, AS FAR AS KNOWN, IS
YUGOSLAV/JASTREB/GALEB A STARTER. BAC CONSULTANT SOLIMAN
INFORMED. REQUEST FIRM ETA FROM BAGHDAD IN DUE COURSE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO MINTECH AND BAGHDAD.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[PASSED TO MINTECH]

Mr Steadman
DTSD

Do you know what
is going on? What
is STRIKEMASTER?

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. AFR. DEPT.

PM Hinchcliffe

CONFIDENTIAL

STRIKEMASTER is BAC 167

GGGGG

in strike role instead of
training role. need no modification
see attached paper

leave copy to N.E.D and E.E. & S. Dept (Mr Barlow) DTSD 24/1

DTSD

26/1/70





BAC 167 *second-generation dual-purpose ground attack/trainer*

BAC 167

A second-generation design dual-purpose Ground Attack/Trainer that economically satisfies the requirements of developing air forces. It provides at single cost advanced basic training and immediate operational strike capacity to deliver a 3,000 lb weapon load of guns/rockets/bombs.


PERFORMANCE

Powered by the highly reliable Rolls-Royce B.S. Viper 20 jet engine of 3,410 lb static thrust (or Viper 11 of 2,500 lb), the BAC 167 has a design diving speed of Mach 0.77 or 450 knots, a ceiling higher than 40,000 feet, a maximum range of more than 1,200 nautical miles, and a maximum endurance of 4½ hours.



PRODUCTION

The BAC 167 (and its lower-powered variant, the Jet Provost Mark 5) are in production for Saudi Arabia, Muscat & Oman, South Yemen, The Sudan, Singapore, and the Royal Air Force.



TRAINING ROLE

Designed to meet the training requirements of the 1970s and beyond, the BAC 167 embodies improvements developed from the accumulated background experience of well over half a million arduous training hours flown by more than 500 Jet Provosts in eight air forces throughout the world. The new aircraft has a pressurised cockpit with wide-range temperature control and this makes high altitude flying safer by improving comfort and reducing fatigue, especially in tropical climates. Greater efficiency results, and instructors, who may have to climb to 35,000 feet three or four times a day, gain particular benefit from this feature.

The BAC 167's high performance permits extension of the basic training syllabus to approach more closely the characteristics of supersonic aircraft and to cover modern weapons training. It also offers the economy that can be made from reducing the instructional hours flown on more expensive advanced training aircraft.

The wing has been given great strength and a particularly long fatigue life to withstand the high, rapidly changing loads that are imposed during aerobatics and in the repeated take offs and landings made by pupils under training. Based on a 400 hours per year utilisation to a typical RAF syllabus, the BAC 167 has a fatigue life of 13 years.

Fuel is carried in two integral tanks, six bag tanks, and the tip tanks, to give a normal capacity of 358 gallons. This can be increased by carrying two 75 and two 50 gallon tanks underwing to provide a total of 608 gallons, which gives a range of 1,200 nautical miles or an endurance of 4½ hours.

SIDE-BY-SIDE SEATING

The side-by-side seating arrangement adopted in the BAC 167 has been proved to give superior results in both basic and weapon training roles (and is of outstanding advantage in ground attack). Both pupil and instructor watch the same instrument display and a more efficient performance results.

STRIKE ROLE

For ground attack the BAC 167 provides a highly flexible mission capability with long endurance for 'time over the target' or wide radius of action. It can operate from grass or p.s.p. or laterite surfaced strips, can lift its maximum load out of hot and high airfields, and is cost-effective because it delivers a big armament load for a modest purchase price and low operating cost.

Intermix of additional fuel and a variety of weapons on the eight carrying points permits choice of the optimum weapon-load/range/endurance combination to suit a particular mission. A multi-camera reconnaissance pod can also be carried.

Two fuselage-mounted 7.62 mm calibre FN machine guns and 1,200 rounds of ammunition are carried on all missions. These may be supplemented by up to four underwing mini-gun pods housing either 0.5 inch calibre Browning guns or GEC 7.62 mm rotating-barrel guns.

The BAC 167's fire power, and the accurate delivery obtained from its high performance, manoeuvrability, and simple optical sighting system, makes it a formidable addition to the fighting strength of any air force.

The choice of strike weapons includes such combinations as:



2 guns, 8 x 25 lb anti-personnel bombs,
plus 16 Sura 80 mm rockets.



2 guns, plus 72 SNEB 68 mm rockets
in four Matra type 155 launchers.



2 guns, plus 4 x 500 lb
high explosive bombs.



2 guns, plus 2 x 50 gallon and
2 x 75 gallon underwing fuel tanks.

TRAINING ROLE **BAC167** STRIKE ROLE





Saudi Arabian BAC 167 ordered for training Royal Saudi Air Force pilots. The aircraft is carrying 75 gallon underwing fuel tanks for long range.



BAC 167 carrying 36 rockets in Matra launchers and two 75 gallon fuel tanks.



The RAF's Jet Provost Mark 5 with Viper 11 engine of 2,500 lb thrust.



Firing a salvo of SNEB 68 mm rockets from the underwing launchers.

BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
the most powerful aerospace company in Europe

PRESTON DIVISION
Warton Aerodrome, Lancashire, England

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELNO STOW 4


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TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

5 FEBRUARY 1970.

4

TOP COPY



CONFIDENTIAL

FOR EIR 1A2 SUBJECT REFURBISHED HUNTERS. REFERENCE YOUR
TELNO STOW 8 TO AMMAN DATED 27 JAN 70 UNDERSTAND
THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT IN PRICES AND DELIVERY DATES
QUOTED IN YOUR STOW 30 OF 31 JULY 69. PLEASE
CONFIRM LATEST QUOTATIONS AS IRAQI AIR FORCE INTERESTED.
MY LETTER AA/694/3 DATED 11 SEP 69 REFERS.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO MINTECH]

STOW DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.

D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDDD

Be *[Signature]*
10/2

n

NO DISTRIBUTION

Ha. NE Dept
Ha. DTS Dept

OUT TO BAGHDAD TELNO STOW 7 OF 18/2 CYPHER CAT A UNIT 11 CROSS

ROUTINE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 FEB 1970 NEQ 10/4

Regopa. RUM
19/2

CYPHER CAT A
ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 7

TO BAGHDAD
18 FEBRUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR1A2 MINTECH.

YOUR STOW 4.

SUBJECT REFURBISHED HUNTERS.

PRICE OF HUNTER MK4 TO MK9 CONVERSIONS WOULD BE ABOUT POUNDS
STERLING 205,000 AND DELIVERY ABOUT FOURTEEN MONTHS. IT SHOULD
HOWEVER BE BORNE IN MIND THAT AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR THIS
CONVERSION ARE ON OFFER TO OTHER COUNTRIES SO HAWKERS CANNOT QUOTE
FIRMLY AT THIS TIME.

GRATEFUL FOR MORE SPECIFIC INDICATION OF IRAQI INTEREST
GIVING NUMBERS.

STEWART

Neg. P.O.

Military Equipment 6
C Iraq 9/3/70



DISTRIBUTED TO

SENT M.O.D.

MOD. OF DEFENCE DEPT.

TO MOD ARMY. OF P.U.S.D.

6 MARCH 1970 P.U.S.D.

PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.

MOD. OF COMINS. DEPT.

EXAMINERS

FILE R K 129

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER OYT 060830Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR MOD ARMY TELNO. OYT 060830Z MAR 70

FOR TUFFILL FROM SHARPE. AN IRAQI BUSINESSMAN

ABDUL KHALIQ AL ABIDFIS EN ROUTE LONDON VIA LEIPZIG FAIR

AND INTENDS CONTACTING YOU ON APPROX 10 MARCH. HIS COUSIN

IS DIRECTOR OF MILITARY ENGINEERING AND ABID WILL ASK

FOR ARMoured ENGINE EQUIPMENT, AND BEEHIVES, GIANT

VIPER ETC. I HAVE ALREADY PROCESSED THE FIRST OF THESE AND

GENERAL HALL HAS SAID NOTHING WILL BE AVAILABLE UNTIL ROYAL

ENGINEERS GET CHIEFTAIN UNLESS IRAQIS GO IN FOR VERY EXPENSIVE

SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BASED ON CENTURION. THIS I HAVE

PASSED ON BUT CURRENT IRAQI LINE IS THAT MY OFFICE PRODUCES

NOTHING THEY ASK FOR AND THEY THINK THEY CAN DO BETTER THROUGH

AGENTS. I AM ANXIOUS TO DISPEL THIS IDEA AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL

~~LEONARD WOULD LET ME KNOW OF ANY ITEMS ON HIS LIST WHICH Y~~

~~SUPPLY THROUGH~~

~~WOULD BE GRATEFUL~~

Mr. Hinchcliffe

7/7

IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW OF ANY ITEMS ON HIS LIST WHICH ⁰YU COULD
SUPPLY THROUGH ME. THIS WITHOUT INFORMING ABID OR TURNING HIM
DOWN FLAT AS HE IS A USEFUL CONTACT AND DOES QUITE A LOT OF
UNITED KINGDOM BUSINESS. HE MAY ALSO APPROACH YOU ON SCANNELL
TRANSPORTERS AND OTHER ITEMS ALL OF WHICH WOULD BE OF INTEREST
TO ME AS THERE MAY BE SOME ON WHICH I HAVE HAD NO OFFICIAL
APPROACH

SENT TO D. 10. 10. 10.

0005+0
MR. BALFOUR PAUL

SENT AT 1440Z/6 MARCH 1970

RECD AT 1549Z/6 MARCH 1970

Run 76

CONFIDENTIAL

8

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 3 APR 1970
NEQ 10/4

Mr. Egerton

Hunters for Iraq

Mr. Arthur's query on Folio (7).

2. The short answer is no; there are none for Iraq in the foreseeable future at any rate. The R.A.F. have not decided their own requirement up to 1973 so there are no Mk.9 Hunters available. If some do become available then Iraq is a long way down a lengthy waiting list.

3. There are some Mk.4 Hunters available for export which could be modified, but at considerable expense. The Iraqis have made enquiries about the Mk.4 in the past but when they heard of its price (£225,000) their interest evaporated.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

3 April, 1970

Quite satisfactory, I think.

Altington 3/4

Mr Arthur

3/4

*Reg s.p.o. there is
a little Star telegram on this
subject -*

*PRM
6/4*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY STOW 14

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM: KIR 1A2 KINTCH

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR STOW 11. SUBJECT HUNTERS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 7 APR 1970 NEQ 10/4
--

✓ MR STEPHEN
THIS IS NOT

WHAT I UNDERSTOOD
FROM YOU! PLEASE
EXPLAIN TO MINTECH
THAT FCO (S. OTTOM)
PERMISSION WILL BE
REQUIRED BEFORE A
K.A.M.

H.S.A. LTD., ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY SIXTEEN HUNTERS REFINISHED TO MARK 9
STANDARD. THIS IS SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY FROM FIRST DWINDLING STOCKS WHEN
FIRM INTENT IS STATED. WE MUST RE-EMPHASISE THAT ALTHOUGH A CONVERSION OF
THE MARK 4 HUNTER WHEN COMPLETED THIS AIRCRAFT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE
HUNTER MARK 9 STANDARD AT A PRICE SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF £200,000.

OPEN
TO SUPPLY
CAN
BE
GIVEN

REPLIES TO YOUR QUESTIONS:

- (A) EFFECTIVELY YES
- (B) SEVEN YEARS
- (C) AND (D) FIRST AIRCRAFT WOULD BE DELIVERED LATTER
PART OF 1971. SUBJECT TO OTHER COMMITMENTS AND CONTRACT WITHIN
TWO MONTHS. DELIVERY OF SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT ORDERED WITHIN
TWELVE MONTHS AFTER FIRST DELIVERY.

3/4
Kintch are
sending
a quick
follow-up
to make
point at

AS H.S.A. REPRESENTATIVE IS AT PRESENT IN MIDDLE EAST GRATEFUL FOR
IMMEDIATE ADVICE ON WHETHER EARLY VISIT BY HIM IS REQUIRED.

Reg 8/6. NEQ 10/4
PMM

ORIG:- KIR 1A2

INFO:- HEAD OF DEFENCE SALES

US/KIR W. Stinchcliffe

AS/KIR

These Hunters are not available now
KIR 1(C) They are the 5th IV's which will have to be modified
KIR 2(C) (2e later about 18-24 months) and the price

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT F.C.O. for the modification is

FILE NO:- AP/15/01 just over the £200,000 mark. M.O.D.
inform, - Mini Tech.

X
Doe Hunters
is readily
available.
JHR 3/4

DD 4/4

CYPHER

(10 NE)

NO DISTRIBUTION

[Defence]

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM STOW UNNUMBERED

3 APRIL 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 6 APR 1970 NEQ 10/4
--

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR 1(A)2 MINTECH.

SUBJECT: HUNTERS.

FURTHER TO OUR TELEGRAM STOW 14 OF 2 APRIL MUST STRESS THAT SUPPLY OF THE HUNTERS TO IRAQ IS SUBJECT TO H.M.G. AGREEMENT. DO NOT WISH TO DAMPEN PROSPECTS OF SALE BUT AT THIS STAGE IRAQIS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN IMPRESSION THAT THIS ASPECT HAS BEEN CLEARED.

GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR YOUR EARLY ADVICE ON SERIOUSNESS AND POSSIBILITY OF THIS PROSPECT AND WHETHER CLEARANCE BY H.M.G. AT THIS STAGE BE CONSIDERED.

STEWART

Reg & Pa
PMM
6/4.

NNNN

CYPHER/CAT A

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TOP COPY
NEQ 10/4
(11)

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO TEHRAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 190

10 APRIL 1970
(WEQ)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 190 OF 10 APRIL AND TO KUWAIT REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

WE SHALL SHORTLY BE CONSIDERING WHETHER WE SHOULD AGREE TO THE SUPPLY OF SIXTEEN HUNTERS (MARK FOUR REFURBISHED TO MARK NINE STANDARD) TO IRAQ WHO MAY BE ON THE POINT OF PLACING A FIRM ORDER SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ON DELIVERY DATES AND PRICE. HAWKERS CAN SUPPLY ONE HUNTER IN FOURTEEN MONTHS FROM SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT AND THE REMAINDER WITHIN A FURTHER TEN MONTHS. WE SUPPLIED IRAQ WITH SOME SIXTY HUNTERS IN 1963 AND THERE HAS NO DOUBT BEEN CONSIDERABLE WASTAGE OF THE ORIGINAL AIRCRAFT.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT VIEWS ON THE LIKELY REACTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED IF HMG APPROVED THE SUPPLY OF THESE PLANES TO IRAQ.

3. FOR TEHRAN ONLY: IS THE ASSUMPTION IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF OUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 (NOT TO ALL) OF 1969 STILL VALID?

4. FOR KUWAIT ONLY. YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 1969 (NOT TO ALL) REFERS. OF COURSE THE HUNTER IS A MUCH LESS SOPHISTICATED WEAPON THAN THE LIGHTENING.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
N.E.D.
ARABIAN DEPT
DEFENCE DEPT

PMM
COPIES TO:
HEAD OF DI 4, MIN DEFENCE
MR. CHRISTIE, MIN TECHNOLOGY

88888

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TOP COPY

(12)

CYPHER/CAT.A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELNO.280

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

10 APRIL, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 13 APR 1970 NRD 19/4

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 280
DATED 10 APRIL 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO MINTECH.

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO STOW 13 OF 9 APRIL TO MINTECH, REPEATED TO
F.C.O. AND MINTECH'S STOW UNNUMBERED OF 9 APRIL.

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

MAY I SUGGEST THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER THE SALE OF HUNTERS TO
IRAQ IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE ANY FURTHER
CORRESPONDENCE WITH IRAQIS ON POINTS OF DETAIL. IF FOR ANY REASON
THE DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE UNFAVOURABLE, IT IS SURELY UNDESIRABLE
THAT, HAVING OURSELVES ENCOURAGED IRAQI INTEREST IN A DEAL, ON
MINTECH'S AUTHORITY, WE SHOULD DRAW THEM ANY FURTHER UP THE GARDEN
PATH. TO DO SO WOULD DISCREDIT OUR SALES EFFORT AND GIVE AN
IMPRESSION OF IRRESPONSIBILITY.

2. I HOPE I AM WRONG IN SUSPECTING THAT SALE WOULD NOT BE
APPROVED. WITH SOVIET BLOC EQUIPMENT OF IRAQI ARMED FORCES NOW
APPROACHING MONOPOLY, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO KEEP A FOOT IN THE
DOOR. HUNTERS, MOREOVER, ARE NO LONGER REGARDED AS SOPHISTICATED
OR SUBJECT TO SECURITY PROTECTION. GRATEFUL FOR EARLIEST ADVICE
AS HSA LTD'S CURRENT OFFER STIPULATED COMPLETIONS OF CONTRACT BY
END OF MAY.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS TO MINTECH.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED TO MINTECH]

R
AM 74

FILES

N. EAST. DEPT.

DEF. DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

AVI. & TELE. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FROM TEHRAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 259

11 APRIL 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

TOP COPY

13

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TEL NO. 259 OF 11 APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BAGHDAD AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 190: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.



THE ASSUMPTION IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TEL NO 398 OF 1969 REMAINS VALID, BUT I WOULD NOT EXPECT THE SHAH AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO REACT TOO STRONGLY ON HUNTERS. THE SHAH IS STILL DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM SUBVERSIVE AND MILITARY THREAT FROM IRAQ AND SAID AS MUCH TO MR. RENDEL OF THE TIMES YESTERDAY. THE HUNTER DELIVERY DATES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY NEAR THE DATE OF FINAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF. IF THE DEAL GOES THROUGH, THEREFORE, THE IRANIANS MAY WELL COMPLAIN, THOUGH LARGELY FOR THE RECORD AND MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. IN GENERAL I THINK THE SHAH WOULD BE FAIRLY RELAXED AND, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT WE WERE PRE-EMPTING RUSSIAN SALES (PARA 3 OF TEHRAN TEL NO 56).

2. IF A FIRM ORDER IS PLACED, OR IF NEGOTIATIONS SEEM LIKELY TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER, I WOULD LIKE AUTHORITY TO TELL THE IRANIANS IN CONFIDENCE AND URGE THEM TO LOOK AT THE DEAL REALISTICALLY.

F.C.O. PASS KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

SIR D. WRIGHT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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DEFENCE DEPT

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HEAD OF DI 4, M.O.D.
MR. CHRISTIE, MIN TECH.

B MWP
174

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY KUWAIT TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 129

12 APRIL 1970.

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 APR 1970

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TEL.NO. 129 OF 12 APRIL, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCE AMMAN, TEL AVIV
CAIRO AND WASHINGTON. (11)

YOUR TELNO. 190 [TO TEHRAN]: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

1. I THINK THAT THE COMMENTS IN THE AMBASSADOR'S TELNO 51 OF
1969 (NOT TO ALL) STILL APPLY IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS OF
COURSE NOW 18 MONTHS SINCE WE LAST DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION
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2. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW I UNDERSTAND THE 16
HUNTERS WOULD REPRESENT AN INCREASE OF SOME 15 PER CENT
IN THE FIGHTER STRENGTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE. THIS DOES NOT
PRESENT A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE BALANCE BETWEEN IRAQI
AIR STRENGTH AND KUWAITI AIR WEAKNESS. THE KUWAIT MILITARY
AUTHORITIES MAY WELL STILL ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT IT IS HELPFUL
TO WEAN THE IRAQIS FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR
THEIR ARMS SUPPLIES.

3. IF HMG APPROVE SUPPLY I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY
TO SPEAK TO THE KUWAITIS (PROBABLY SHEIKH SAAD) AT AN EARLY
STAGE. I WOULD THEN ARRANGE FOR GENERAL MUBARAK ALSO TO BE INFORMED.
FCO PASS TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD AND ALSO ALL SAVINGS.

MR. GODDISON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MR. CHRISTIE, MINTECH.

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PO PMA 17/7

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
15

Defence
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PP BAGHDAD GROUPS 150A

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY MINTECH
TELEGRAM NO STOW U/N

TO BAGHDAD
10 APRIL 1970



CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR 1(A)2.
YOUR STOW 13.

NO DISTRIBUTION

COMPANY RELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE DETAILS BY CABLE. REPRESENTATIVE AVAILABLE IN CYPRUS FOR A FEW MORE DAYS READY TO TRAVEL SOONEST.

BY REVISED ALLOCATION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AIRCRAFT COMPANY MIGHT BE ABLE TO COMMENCE DELIVERY 14 MONTHS FROM SIGNATURE BUT QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE DELIVERY OF SIXTEEN WITHIN THREE MONTHS.

MORE HONEST AND REALISTIC PROMISE WOULD BE FURTHER TEN MONTHS BUT THIS MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF VERY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN FINAL NEGOTIATIONS.

COMPANY UNLIKELY TO AGREE PRICE BELOW £195,000 REPEAT ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE THOUSAND POUNDS PER AIRCRAFT IN VIEW OF ACTUAL COSTS AND CONTRACTS CONCLUDED ELSEWHERE.

GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL ADVISE IF H.S.A. REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD VISIT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS. IF HE COMES AT THIS STAGE HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT SUPPLY IS SUBJECT TO H.M.G. AGREEMENT.

BAGHDAD TELNO 280.

FCO ARE PURSUING SUGGESTION IN PARA ONE URGENTLY.

STEWART

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PMM

12/4

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PMM
176

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Please enter

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L.H.34PT



MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 1(a),
Room 301,

Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 103

Our reference: AP/13/01

13 APR 1970

Your reference:

10th April 1970

Dear

Stephenson

NEQ 10/4

Hunters for Iraq.

*Approved
Submarine
K.L.*

There are very strong indications that Iraq may wish to order sixteen (16) Hunter Mk.9 aircraft. These aircraft would be conversions from the Mk.4 type and the order is valued at about £4M.

Advice on the possibility of this order materializing and on the advisability of an early visit by the HSA Ltd representative has been sought from our Embassy in Baghdad (our STOW U/N of 3rd April). — (10)

Subject to advice from Baghdad and as events could now move very swiftly we should be grateful if you could give the question of supply of these aircraft to Iraq your consideration.

I am copying this to all members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

J.P. Sheen
J.P. SHEEN

A.D.J. Stephenson Esq.,
Defence Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
London S.W.1.

Miss.B.M. Potter MOD, Sales (N)

R.W. Browne Esq., MOD Sales(A)

Wing Colm. Stinchcombe, MOD, DFS (C Team)

Miss.K.E. Wood, D.S.8(a), MOD

A.D.J. Stephenson Esq., DTSD, FCO

O.G.E. Dickson Esq., HM Treasury

J. Coates Esq., EIR 2(o)

J.B. Wade Esq., D.S.13(b) MOD

Reg &
submit

MM

Head of NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

[Copy sent to Hd of Defense Dept.]

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(17)

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PRIORITY MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW UNNUMBERED

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM EIR 1(A) MINTECH

YOUR STOW 12. SUBJECT : HUNTERS. (For (Arv))

FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE H.S.A. AGENT BROWN WAS ON THE SAME PLANE
AS THE IRAQ AIR FORCE COMMANDER TRAVELLING CAIRO-BEIRUT.

THE I.A.F. COMMANDER CONFIRMED INTEREST IN HUNTERS SAYING IRAQ
WOULD PURCHASE SUBJECT TO RIGHT PRICE AND DELIVERY THESE DETAILS
SUPPLIED IN OUR STOW 14. - (9)

WE HAVE SOUNDED OUT F.C.O. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT ON CLEARANCE
QUESTION WHICH AWAITS YOUR COMMENTS.

STEWART

10/4 RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 APR 1970
NEQ 10/4

TO BAGHDAD
APRIL 1970

Pa PMM
13h.

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DRAFT *CABLE / SAVINGRAM

ORIGINAL and FOUR legible carbon copies, all on Avmin Form 97, typed (or in BLOCK CAPITALS if in manuscript) on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

Date &
T.O.D.

9-4-70

Serial No.

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER(Name) J.P. SHEENRank H.E.O.Branch EIR 1(a)Building Stuart House
301Room 103 Ext. 103Date 9th April 1970COUNTERSIGNED

Signed _____

Rank H.E.O.Branch EIR 1(a)Date 9th April 1970DISTRIBUTION :-

Originator

EIR 1(a)INFORMATION COPIES TO :-US/EIRAS/EIR1EIR 1(a)Near Eastern Dept.,Defence Dpt., FCOFile No. AP/13/01†Priority marking: PRIORITYTO : BAGHDAD

FOR : _____

FROM : EIR 1(a) MitechTEXT (use double spacing for cables)

Your STOW 12. Subject: Hunters.

For your information the H.S.A. agent Brown was on the same plane as the Iraq Air Force Commander travelling Cairo-Beirut.

The I.A.F. Commander confirmed interest in Hunters saying Iraq would purchase subject to right price and delivery these details supplied in our STOW 14.

We have scoured out F.C.O. Defence Department on clearance question which awaits your comments.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 338 13 APRIL 1970
CONFIDENTIAL

18

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO. 338 OF 13 APRIL 1970,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN
BAGHDAD, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED IN (R) AMMAN REGISTRY No. 10 14 APR 1970 NEP 10/4
--

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 190 TO TEHERAN : HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

AS YOU HAVE NO DOUBT ALREADY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, WE ARE BOUND TO EXPOSE OURSELVES TO ISRAELI CRITICISM IF THIS DEAL COMES TO THEIR EAR, AS IT IS BOUND TO DO. A YEAR OR MORE AGO THEY WERE CONSTANTLY ASKING IF WE COULD SUPPLY HUNTERS TO THEM AND WE TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD NONE TO OFFER. THIS MAY PRODUCE SOME SOUR COMMENTS NOW.

2. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THEY NOW HAVE MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT AND ARE UNLIKELY TO REGARD 16 HUNTERS IN IRAQI HANDS AS ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE MILITARY THREAT .

3. POLITICALLY, AS I HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, THEY ARE EYEING IRAQ SUSPICIOUSLY AT THE MOMENT AND WONDERING IF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE KURDS WILL INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAQ OR ALLOW THE IRAQIS TO INCREASE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE JORDANIAN FRONT AGAINST ISRAEL. I WONDER THEREFORE IF YOU HAVE CONSIDERED PUTTING ANY CONDITIONS ON THE SALE, E.G. THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE USED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES IN IRAQ ITSELF ONLY.

4. IF YOU DECIDE TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS DEAL I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO EXPLAIN MATTERS TO THE ISRAELIS IN ADVANCE AND FOR GUIDANCE ON THE LINE TO BE TAKEN, E.G. OUR HOPES OF MINIMISING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAQ.

F C O PASS IMMEDIATE TO TEHERAN, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (R), AND WASHINGTON.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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N. EASTERN D.
ARABIAN D.
DEFENCE D.

COPIES TO: HD. OF D.I.4 MOD.
MR. CHRISTIE, MINTECH.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE: STOW 16

SENT 13.4.70

TO: BAGHDAD

FOR: AIR ATTACHE

FROM: KIR 1a 2

SUBJECT: STRIKEMASTERS

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

14 APR 1970

NEQ 10/4

Reg 8
19
mlt
PMM
14/4

THORNBURGH OF BAC HAS ASKED US TO SEEK YOUR VIEW OF IRAQI REACTION
TO THE LATE JANUARY STRIKEMASTER PRESENTATION IN ORAQ.
GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE.

P. J. M.
20/4

ORIG:- KIR 1A2

INFO: US/KIR

AS/KIR

DEFENCE DEPT. F.C.O.

NEAR EASTERN DEPT. F.C.O.

File No:- AP/36202

(20)

NEQ 10/4

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NEI
Cranham
DD.

(16)

ADVANCE COPY
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PUS
N. Torgan
(H) N. East
(H) Defence

AnsL

(H) DIL, not

CYPHER CAT A Mr. Christie M/Tech

IMMEDIATE FROM TEHRAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 259

11 APRIL 1970

RC

RMMAAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TEL NO. 259 OF 11 APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BAGHDAD AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

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F.C.O. PASS KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

SIR D. WRIGHT

(21)

NEQ 10/4

Mr. [unclear]

Washoe P 13

ADVANCE COPY
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Arthur
✓ Hds. [unclear]
Arab. [unclear]
Deb. [unclear]

CYPHER/CA T A

PRIORITY KUWAIT

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129

12 APRIL 1970

x (5)

[Depth.]

(KYL)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED FCO TELNO 129 OF 12 APRIL RFI BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN
AND SAVING BAHRAIN RESIDENCY AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.
YOUR TELNO 190¹ ^[TO TEHRAN] HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

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FCO PASS TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD AND ALSO ALL SAVINGS.

[Signature]

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GOODISON

SENT 1403Z/12 APRIL

RECD 1535Z/12 APRIL



Tolson

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overrun

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**BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

1. Mr. R. L. R. R.

2. Enter

22

1974

14 April, 1970

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
16 APR 1970
NEC 50A

Dear Stephen,

Hunters for Iraq.

We were interested to see in your telegram No. 190 of 10 April to Tehran that a decision will shortly be taken on the advisability of supplying a further sixteen Hunters to Iraq.

2. Any development in the supply of arms to the Middle East, especially aircraft, is bound to be of considerable interest to the State Department at the present time. You will recall that, when Secretary Rogers announced the President's decision not to supply Phantoms and Skyhawks to Israel he said that "if steps are taken which might upset the current balance or if, in our judgement, political developments warrant, the President will not hesitate to reconsider the matter." Clearly the supply of sixteen Hunters over a two-year period will not materially affect the current balance of arms throughout the Middle East and we do not anticipate any difficulties with the State Department on this score. There are, however, as you know full well from your time in New York, any number of Israeli supporters both in Congress and in the country at large who will seek to exploit every opportunity that comes to hand to put pressure on the Administration to reconsider their earlier decision. A decision to supply Hunters to Iraq will certainly be exploited to the full by this lobby no matter what reasonable and logical arguments we put forward to justify the decision.

3. The State Department will also be interested in this issue because it is somewhat akin to the problems they are facing over the supply of another eight F5 aircraft to Libya, about which I am writing separately to Julian Walker.

4. In view of these considerations I very much hope that you will authorise us to keep the State Department informed about how this goes. Ideally we would like to tell them well in advance that we were proposing to give the go-ahead to Hawkers to enter into negotiations with the Iraqis for the sixteen Hunters so that they could take this into account in their own plans for the Middle East. Even if this is not possible, it seems to us very important that we should let them know when a sale seems likely - particularly as the recent French failure to inform the Americans adequately about their decision to supply Mirage aircraft to Libya provoked a few ruffled feathers in the State Department.

Yours ever,
Ramsay.
(M. R. Melhuish)

S. L. Egerton, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, S.W. 1.
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RECEIVED IN
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10 APR 1970

for NED ✓
Def. Dept.

RR BAGHDAD

OPS 45A

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ROUTINE MINTECH
TELEGRAM NO. STOW 16

REGISTRY No. 10
TO BAGHDAD
13 APRIL 1970.

NED 10/9

CONFIDENTIAL.
FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR1A2.
SUBJECT: STRIKEMASTERS.

THORNBUR OF BAC HAS ASKED US TO SEEK YOUR VIEW OF IRAQI
REACTION TO THE LATE JANUARY STRIKEMASTER PRESENTATION IN
IRAQ.

GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE.

STEWART

NO which aff.

N.E.D.

Reg 210. Pmmmm 20/4

Mr Stewart

No program as all —

The Iraqis' attitude here says
they are all available for him

Do you know how far these

negotiations have gone? H.M.

Ammanah, I am sure will not
believe any until a ruling on

the 'Hunter' case has been given
by H.M.C.

PMM Hamble

15/4

but of course, after a demonstration
he will be paid to his
NNNN SENT AT
baker and. It looks pretty
dead at the moment.

corruption

DD 7/4

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

14 April, 1970



W 24
1. Mr. Hinchcliffe
2. Enter

19/4

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Yours ever,
Ramsay.
(M. R. Melhuish)

S. L. Egerton, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, S.W. 1.

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SECRET

NEO 104	RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 23 APR 1970
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Mr. Miers

Mr. Hayman

(24)

Mr. Arthur

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ

Problem

A The Iraq Government may soon place a firm order for 16 reconditioned Hawker Hunter jet fighters, subject to negotiations on delivery dates and price. H.M. Ambassador Baghdad has asked that a decision on the political acceptability of such a sale should be taken before negotiations on detail proceed to avoid possible re-examination later.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we should inform our Ambassador in Baghdad that we have no objection to the supply of these aircraft to Iraq and that our Ambassadors in Tehran, Kuwait and Jedda should be authorised to inform the Governments to which they are accredited of our decision if and when the Iraqis place a firm order. H.M. Ambassador Tel Aviv should be authorised to explain the position if the Israelis raise the subject. The Embassy at Washington should be authorised, as they have requested, to brief the State Department as soon as a decision to supply is taken, so that the Americans can take it into account in their own planning on arms supplies to the region. Arabian Department and Defence Department (who have consulted the Ministry of Defence) agree.

Argument

3. The aircraft in question are Mark 4 Hunters refurbished to Mark 9 Standard. The total value of the order

/would

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order would be just over £3 million, and the aircraft would be delivered from between 14 to 24 months from signature of contract.

4. In 1963, we agreed to supply 52 Hunters to Iraq, then as now under a Ba'athist regime. Between 1963 and 1967 we supplied a further 15. 41 of these aircraft are still in serviceable condition. The operational radius of the refurbished Mark 4 is 575 miles. There are altogether some 210 Combat aircraft in service in the Iraqi Air Force including 60 MiG 21 Interceptors. These are, of course, considerably more sophisticated aircraft even than the Hunter Mark 9.

5. The principles which govern decisions we make on the supply of military equipment to the Arab States are set out in a paper (OPD (67) 78) which the former Secretary of State submitted to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in November, 1967. The principles relevant in this case are that:-

- (a) we should continue to have regard to the effect of the balance of forces in the area in all our decisions about arms supplies;
- (b) we should as far as possible avoid supplying arms of greater offensive power and those already employed in the area, and we should not supply arms which are exclusively offensive in character;

/(c)

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SECRET

- (c) we should examine particularly closely the supply of arms to Arab countries which maintain a hostile attitude towards us;
- (d) in accordance with our established practice, where we supplied a particular type of equipment we should normally be ready to supply spares because of the overriding commercial interest involved.

6. Agreement on our part to supply the 16 Hunters to Iraq would not conflict with the principles (a) and (b). The Hawker Hunter is not exclusively an offensive aircraft and is capable of being deployed in a variety of rôles, dependent on the armament it carries. The addition of 16 aircraft of obsolescent and unsophisticated pattern to the Iraqi Air Force will not make an effective difference to the balance of forces in the area.

7. As to principle (c), Iraq has not been consistently hostile towards us, but from time to time, usually in response to British press criticism of Iraq's repressive and occasionally barbaric internal acts (mass trials, followed by executions), she has displayed some hostility./ Anglo-Iraqi relations are never likely to be really satisfactory because of our stand on Palestine but this fact, taken by itself, should not inhibit us from supplying military equipment to Iraq where we have valuable interests to try to preserve. As far as principle (d) is concerned, although this is not, strictly speaking, a question of
/supplying

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supplying spare parts, it is at least arguable that as we have supplied a considerable number of Hunters in the past we are now merely providing replacement aircraft for those which have become unserviceable because of wastage, or for other reasons, since 1963.

8. The attitude of Iraq's neighbours to the possible supply of Hunters.

(a) Iran

The Shah is known to be upset by the increased opportunities the Iraqis will have for mischief-making in Kuwait and the Gulf generally as a result of the 11 March agreement with the Kurds. But the Department's view is that this has a less than evens chance of enduring. Furthermore, H.M. Ambassador Tehran does not expect that the Shah and his government would react too strongly to the news of this sale, and would accept Baghdad's argument that we were pre-empting assured Soviet sales if we did ~~supply~~ supply.

(b) Kuwait

Our Defence commitment to Kuwait expires finally in May 1971. The Kuwaitis are undoubtedly increasingly perturbed about the possibility of Iraqi action against Kuwait following the Kurdish settlement. Mr. Goodison's view however is that this sale would not make a significant difference to the present balance between Iraqi air strength and Kuwaiti air weakness. This is true. The Kuwaiti military authorities would also, in his opinion, accept as valid the "foot in the door" argument made by

/Mr. Balfour Paul

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Mr. Balfour Paul and although "mildly perturbed" would not express any strong reaction to the sale.

(The reason for their perhaps rather uncritical acceptance is the Arab belief that arms supplies ensure influence more than any other single act).

(c) Saudi Arabia

The Saudis have more than enough aircraft to defend themselves with and would not in our view be upset by a decision to supply, provided we explained the position to them fully when a firm order was placed.

(d) The Gulf Sheikhdoms

The Residency have not commented on our telegram seeking the views of our Embassies in Tehran and Kuwait on the proposed sale. However the view of those in MOD concerned with our defence commitments to the Gulf Sheikhdoms until the date of their termination in 1971 is that though they do not like the proposed sale much, they are hard put to advance specific arguments against it, particularly when represented as a "topping-up" exercise.

(e) Israel

It is clear from Mr. Barnes' telegram that he does not think that the Israelis with their existing Phantoms etc. would see 16 revamped Hunters as much (if anything) of an additional military threat. The Iraqi Air Force has not been used against Israel since the end of the June 1967 war. The Israeli reaction would more probably be one of sourness that we have not offered Hunters to them. Last year they were
/interested

SECRET

SECRET

interested in a large order (40 Hunters and 50 Harriers). These could not be supplied in the time specified. We believe they would probably not be interested in a considerably smaller number of refurbished Hunters. We also do not think it would be either necessary or desirable to tell the Israelis of a decision to supply in advance of such an act.

9. U.S. attitude to supply by us.

Our Embassy in Washington do not expect the State Department to make difficulties over an order of this size supplied over two years. But they have asked to be authorised to give the U.S. authorities maximum possible notice of a decision one way or the other.

10. Refusal to supply

If we were to refuse to supply the Hunters there is little doubt that the Iraqis could obtain an equivalent aircraft (such as the obsolescent MiG 19) elsewhere and probably more cheaply. Now that the fighting in Kurdistan has stopped one of the main difficulties inhibiting the supply of Russian arms to Iraq has been removed. It is likely therefore that the withholding of our permission would achieve little besides adding to the present regime's complex about persecution by the West, which is never far from the surface; this in turn would put unnecessary fresh strain on Anglo-Iraqi relations.

Background

11. The history of supply of Hunters to Iraq has been covered above. In early 1969, we were prepared to consider favourably the supply of Lightning aircraft plus Red Top /missiles

SECRET

SECRET

missiles to Iraq, but in the event Iraqi interest never crystallised. In February 1969 we agreed to supply the Tiger Cat ground to air missile, but once again Iraqi interest evaporated and no order emerged.

11. The Kuwait and Saudi Arabian Air Forces are equipped with a number of Lightning Aircraft. Israel and Iran of course have Phantoms. Some of the Gulf States are planning to equip themselves with Hunters which may or may not form the nucleus of a U.A.E. Air Force.



(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Department
16 April, 1970

This is a difficult one: as usual, one wishes that we did not have the arms to sell!


2. Nevertheless, I agree with Mr. Tripp's submission, which I had previously discussed with the Department. The recommendation is in line with the Permanent Under-Secretary's view that we should do everything we can to keep Iraq's links with the West and arrest the Soviet advance. Admittedly, the supply of sixteen Hunters might not do much in this direction, but a refusal could do a good deal in the opposite direction.

/I

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
SECRET

I think therefore that we should raise no objection to the sale but hope (and there is some reason to hope) that the delivery dates (see paragraph 3 of Mr. Tripp's minute) will so disappoint the Iraqis that they will lose interest.


(G. G. ARTHUR)
16 April, 1970.

Mr. Niers (for Mr. Luard)

In the light of the comments from the various posts which would be affected by a decision to supply Hunters for Iraq set out in paragraphs 8 and 9, I think we should proceed as recommended in this submission. The crucial argument seems to me that if we refuse to supply the Iraqis will certainly go to the Russians and the position of the Soviet Union in Iraq will be correspondingly strengthened still further. We shall not, I think, be violating the principles in paragraph 5 of the submission. The plain fact is that there is still a modest amount of goodwill in Iraq for the United Kingdom. I think we should do all we can to avoid diminishing this goodwill: we should try and maintain what few links remain between Iraq and the West.


(P.T. Hayman)
20 April, 1970.

SECRET

SECRET

Mr Tupper

I agree that we should go ahead
with this. It will not significantly affect
the military balance, and it will not breach
any of the other principles we have set our-
selves. But it will do something to reduce
some tensions between the West and Iraq and
to hold up some alternatives to exclusive
dependence on the Soviet Union.

21/4.

cc Mr Thompson
Mr Ashton

Mr Kitching

Pl. ofr Tel to Baghdad,
neighboring posts and Washington

21/4

Mr Stebbins (Det. Det.)
Thompson 21/4

I have informed Mr Benjamin - Mr. Thomas
CIA about this & he has told 2 Tels sent
Hawkins. PM Hinchell 24/4. a.

22/4

SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL

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From: Miss K E Wood




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: ~~WHITELAND HOUSE~~
01-930 7022 Extn 7038Our reference: DS8/19/10
Your reference: AP/13/01J P Sheen Esq
Ministry of Technology
EIR 1a
Stuart House
23-25 Soho Square
W1

22 April 1970



Dear Mr Sheen

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ

1. Your letter of 10 April to Mr Stephenson refers.
2. The Air Staff have asked that further sales of Hunter aircraft to Iraq should not take place until after mid-1971, when our treaty commitments in the area come to an end. I presume that refurbishing and conversion of the Hunters would take the usual 12-15 months, which would bring us to mid-1971, but would be grateful if this operational point could be borne in mind if FCO agreement to go ahead is given.
3. I am copying this letter to all members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely

K. E. WOOD

Mr Stephenson

Arranging that the timetable
must be given by
(14-24 months)
no problem.
Could be told
(The minimum
be possible)
that the timetable
Hawkins is correct
then there is
Perlan the wood
been discussing
has been marked to you)
the Air Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PMH Humble
27/4

Copies for information:-

Mr M H Tallboys
Head of DS13
MOD
Main Building
SW1

Mr O G E Dickson
Treasury
SW1

Miss M Betteridge
BOT
1 Victoria Street
London
SW1

Mr R W Browne
MOD (Army Sales Department)
St Christopher House
Southwark Street
SE1

Mr A B Fayle
DS13(b) MOD
Main Building
SW1

Mr J Coates - EIR 2c } **Mintech**
Mr L Savigar - EIR 1c }

Mr A D G Stephenson
Defence Training and Supply Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

Miss B M Potter
MOD (Navy Sales)
36 Whitehall
SW1

Mrs D E J Brooke
DI73
Metropole Building

Wing Commander A B Stinchcombe
DPS (C Team)

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 912
CONFIDENTIAL

TO WASHINGTON

22 APRIL 1970
(MQ)

26

NEQ 10/9

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 912 OF 22 APRIL REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD.

SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.

(27)

MY TEL 415 TO BAGHDAD: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

YOU MAY INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT WE HAVE GIVEN THE GO
AHEAD TO HAWKERS. (MELHUISE'S LETTER OF 14 APRIL TO EGERTON).

2. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT, JUDGING FROM THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS
ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A FIRM ORDER WILL
NOT, IN THE END, BE PLACED. DIFFICULTIES OVER PRICE AND
DELIVERY DATES MAY WELL DISCOURAGE THE IRAQIS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT
WILL BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE, BETWEEN 1963 AND 1967, SUPPLIED 67
HUNTERS TO THE IRAQI AIRFORCE; 41 OF THESE ARE STILL IN SERVICEABLE
CONDITION AND THE NEW ORDER, IF IT GOES THROUGH, CAN BE REGARDED
TO SOME EXTENT AS A TOPPING-UP OPERATION.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT MAY ALSO LIKE TO KNOW THAT OUR DECISION
TO SUPPLY THESE HUNTERS WAS LARGELY INFLUENCED BY THE KNOWLEDGE
THAT IRAQ HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET BLOC
FOR HER MILITARY HARDWARE. THEREFORE, ANYTHING THAT WE CAN DO TO
CHALLENGE SOVIET PREDOMINANCE IN THIS FIELD MUST BE TO OUR
(AND THE WEST'S) ADVANTAGE.

4. AS H.M. AMBASSADORS IN TEHRAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND TEL AVIV ARE
NOT INFORMING GOVTS. OF OUR DECISION TO SUPPLY UNTIL THE DEAL
SEEMS FIRM (IF THAT POINT IS IN FACT REACHED), IT IS PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT THAT THE STATE DEPT. SHOULD KEEP THE INFORMATION IN
THIS AND MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM TO A RESTRICTED CIRCLE
WITHIN THEIR OWN DEPARTMENT.

should be 415
to Baghdad
(see 31)

PMMM

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
N.E.D.
ARABIAN DEPT
DEFENCE DEPT

COPIES TO:
HEAD OF D.I.4, MOD
MR. J.R. CHRISTIE, EIR DIVISION,
MIN TECH

&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/9

27
JOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 415

TO BAGHDAD
22 APRIL 1970.
(NEQ)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 22 APRIL AND TO
WASHINGTON REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN
RESIDENCY AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO JEDDA AND SAVING TO PARIS MOSCOW
UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 250 AND MY TELEGRAM NO 190 TO TEHRAN (NOT TO ALL):

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE SUPPLY OF SIXTEEN RECONDITIONED MARK
FOUR AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ. HAWKERS ARE BEING INFORMED IN ORDER TO
ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS ON POINTS OF DETAIL TO PROCEED.

2. MIDDLE EAST POSTS CONCERNED (TEHRAN KUWAIT JEDDA AND TEL AVIV)
SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT AT THIS STAGE INFORM THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH
THEY ARE ACCREDITED. WHEN WE HEAR FROM BAGHDAD THAT THIS DEAL IS
LIKELY TO GO THROUGH, OR WHEN IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT OUR AGREEMENT
TO SUPPLY IS LIKELY TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE WE WILL INSTRUCT
YOU FURTHER.

3. FOR WASHINGTON ONLY. PLEASE SEE MYTEL 912 (NOT TO ALL).

STEWART.

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MR. CHRISTIE, I.E.R., MIN TECH

&&&&

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28
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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1233

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE


24 APRIL 1970

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 1233 OF 24 APRIL 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD AND SAVING PARIS MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELNO. 912 OF 22 APRIL
ACTION TAKEN.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD AND SAVING PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MR. FREEMAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]



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ARAB. DEPT.

DEF. DEPT.

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MR. J.R. CHRISTIE,
EIR. DIVN., MINTECH.

GGGGG

Po WMM

29/4

CYPHER

(29)
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
29 APR 1970
NEQ 15/A

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY MINTECH
TELEGRAM NO. STOW U/N

TO BAGHDAD
27 APRIL 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.
FOR AIR ATTACHE
FROM EIR 1(A) MINTECH
SUBJECT: HUNTERS.


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for VEN ✓
Ref Ref

REVERTING BACK TO OUR STOW U/N OF 10 APRIL FIFTH PARAGRAPH.
H.S.A. LTD WHO ARE SHORTLY TO VISIT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE
PRICE CEILING OF £195,000 PER AIRCRAFT RELAYED TO YOU IS NOT
MENTIONED TO THE IRAQIS IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DIVULGED.
MURPHY AND BENNETT OF H.S.A. PLAN TO ARRIVE BAGHDAD BY LUFTHANSA
P.M. THURSDAY 30 APRIL.

STEWART

Reg & Pa
MM
28/4




Reg. No. (30)
AMM
4/15

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 20

TO BAGHDAD
1 MAY 1970.

Near Eastern
Defence

CONFIDENTIAL.
FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR 1(A) MINTECH.



YOUR STOW 19. SUBJECT : HUNTERS.
VISIT OF MURPHY AND BENNETT POSTPONED AS SUGGESTED. IF CONVENIENT
THEY NOW WISH TO ARRIVE BAGHDAD ON 11 MAY FLIGHT BA 752 SUBJECT TO
RECEIPT OF VISA BY BENNETT. A CURRENT TOURIST VISA ISSUED BEIRUT
IS HELD BY MURPHY AND IS VALID FOR PERIOD REQUIRED BUT IT
COULD REQUIRE FURTHER ENDORSEMENT FOR BUSINESS VISIT. MURPHY WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE ON THIS.
MURPHY HAS STRESSED THAT THE AIRCRAFT SUPPLY SITUATION IS GETTING
VERY TIGHT AND LIMITED NUMBER OF HUNTERS AVAILABLE MAY BE RELEASED
ELSEWHERE UNLESS IRAQIS MOVE QUICKLY.

STEWART.

NNNN

TOP COPY (31)

NEA 10/4

EN CLAIR & BY BAG

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 916

TO WASHINGTON

23 APRIL 1970

(MQ)

(26)

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 916 OF 23 APRIL, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD AND SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MYTEL 912.

(26) THE REFERENCE IN PARA FOUR OF THE ABOVE TELEGRAM SHOULD BE TO MYTEL 415 TO BAGHDAD.

(27) STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

ARAB. D.

DEFENCE D.

COPIES TO:

HEAD DI 4 M.O.D.

MR. J.R. CHRISTIE EIR DIV. MINTECH.

P.A. Jms 175

MR *Knichke*
NED

(32)
Defence &
[NED]

OO BAGHDAD GR 68

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 23

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 100
15 MAY 1970
NEQ LOA

DISTRIBUTION

TO BAGHDAD

13 MAY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR 1(A) MINTECH.

YOUR STOW 21: SUBJECT: HUNTERS.

IRAQI EMBASSY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE TELEGRAM REPORTED AS BEING SENT ON 9 MAY. H. S.A. REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CANCELLED EXISTING FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS AND INTEND TO BOOK TENTATIVELY FOR MONDAY 18 MAY. IRAQI EMBASSY WILL POSITIVELY NOT MOVE ON VISAS UNTIL THE AUTHORITY ARRIVES FROM BAGHDAD.

STEWART

P. h m
112

33

Please enter P.A.
LH 30ET

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 1(a)

Room 301


Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintech London Telex

Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 103

Our reference: AP/13/01

Your reference:



15 May, 1970

Dear

Hunters for Iraq

As you will be aware the question of the supply of Hunters to Iraq was examined by H.M.G. in April and it was decided that there would be no objection to such supply. The only stipulation is that no Hunter aircraft should be supplied to Iraq until after mid-1971 when our treaty commitments in the area come to an end.

As you have indicated that refurbishing and conversion of the Hunters will take about fourteen months this condition should not present you with any problem.

Yours sincerely,

J. P. SHEEN

J. Glasscock Esq.,
Special Director and Manager,
Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd.,
Kingston-upon-Thames,
Surrey.

Hidden Copies to:-

All members of the Arms Working Party.

CYPHER

NO

Hd 1-1
Hd EPD

34

CYPHER CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPT
TELEGRAM NUMBER EXCED 34

TO BAGHDAD
22 MAY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL
YOUR EXCED 25.

HAVE CONTACTED HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION WHO HAVE NOT
APPROACHED DEPARTMENT FOR COVER. THEY ARE CABLING THEIR
REPRESENTATIVE GIVING DETAILS OF TERMS AND PREMIUM RATES.

STEWART

NNNN



Reg. No.

Hunters A/C b Iraq

MM

44-

35

NO DIST

Defunct

TO BAGHDAD
20 MAY 1970

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
NE Q 10/4

YOUR STOW 24. ISLANDER DEMONSTRATION.

2. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE ON EXTENT OF ISLANDER INTEREST AND WHETHER THERE IS A MILITARY INTEREST.

o/f . Mr ~~Stellen~~ der post

What is this
I wonder?

Per June 3/6 WMHumb
per

21/8

WE ARE INFORMED BY BRITTEN-NORMAN THAT THE AIRCRAFT INTENDING TO VISIT BAGHDAD APPROXIMATELY MID-MAY ON ITS WAY BACK FROM INDIA WAS DAMAGED BY AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT DUE TO AN UNSUSPECTED AIR-FIELD HAZARD AT RAWALPINDI. THE AIRCRAFT WAS WRITTEN OFF. BRITTEN-NORMAN ARE EXAMINING POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER AIRCRAFT VISITING IN A FEW WEEKS AND WE SHALL ADVISE YOU FURTHER.

2. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE ON EXTENT OF ISLANDER INTEREST AND WHETHER THERE IS A MILITARY INTEREST.

STEWART

O/F

Mr ~~Stewart~~ ~~per post~~

What is this
Islander?

per 2/6 MMH
wer

NNNN

21/5

Mr Smithcliffe.

N.E.D.

Brittain-Norman Islander is a twin engine light transport aircraft carrying up to 10 passengers. Based at Brambridge Airport, Isle of Wight. Used for a variety of purposes - feeder line - crop spray - short haul transport etc.

20/5/55 -
DO 27/5

Reg 50. A/C to Iraq

AMA 21/5

NE 10/4

(36)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT. A
ROUTINE BAGHDAD TO: MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NO. STOW 34 3 JUNE, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR EIR , REFERENCE YOUR STOW 26 DATED 2 JUNE 1970.

SUBJECT SALE OF HUNTERS. PLEASE INFORM MURPHY OF H.S.A. LTD THAT IRAQI AIR FORCE COMMANDER HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY AND DOES NOT RETURN UNTIL NEXT WEEKEND 7 JUNE. MEANWHILE AIR ATTACHE HAS PROBED FEELINGS ABOUT FADHIL'S LETTER AND PROSPECTS OF ITS REVISION WITH EACH OF OTHER PURCHASING COMMITTEE MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY. FAHIM JALAL HOPED PRICE COULD COME DOWN TO £195,000 IN WHICH CASE HE WAS SURE THE MATTER COULD BE SETTLED. HENCE MY STOW 30 OF 1 JUNE. TODAY SPOKE KHALID SARA WHO HOPED PRICE COULD COME DOWN TO £195,000 PER AIRCRAFT AND £5,000 PER AIRCRAFT SET. HE ALSO HOPED DELIVERY COULD BE BETTER THAN 14 MONTHS. BOTH OFFICERS CONSIDERED THAT THE RETURN OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER WOULD PRODUCE A REVISION OF FADHIL'S LETTER AND NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL THIS OCCURS. ALL ARE WORRIED ABOUT MAINTENANCE OF FLOW OF AIRCRAFT AND SPARES BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF EMBARGO BUT THIS IS NOT SUCH A MAJOR POINT WITH THEM AS PRICE AND DELIVERY PERIOD.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MIN TECH LODNON.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

DEFENCE DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Murphy says
"a very bad
negotiation". At each
session different
negotiators, of
unequal status, took
part!!

GL 576

37

CYPHER

PP BAGHDAD

GPS 50A

Near Eastern

Refugee Dept

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELNO STOW 30

TO BAGHDAD
19 JUNE 1970

RESTRICTED.

FOR AIR ATTACHE.
FROM E.I.R. 1A.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 22 JUN 1970
NEQ 10/24

SUBJECT: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

YOUR STOW 40 REFERS. MURPHY OF H.S.A. ARRIVING BAGHDAD 22
JUNE FLIGHT BA 752 AT 19 55 HOURS AND WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE
REDUCTION ON ARRIVAL.

MINTECH

Regis.
Ann
u.

NNNN

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
19
NEQ 10/4 RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NO STOW 30

1 JUNE 1970

RESTRICTED.

FOR EIR. SUBJECT SALE OF SIXTEEN HUNTERS TO IRAQ.
PLEASE INFORM MURPHY OF HSA LTD THAT MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM
VICE PRESIDENT HARDAN. HE ASKED IF MURPHY COULD STAY IN IRAQ UNTIL
AIR FORCE COMMANDER'S RETURN MONDAY FIRST JUNE WHEN DECISION WOULD
BE MADE IMMEDIATELY. UNFORTUNATELY MURPHY HAD ALREADY DEPARTED.
IAF COMMENT INDICATES THAT FADHIL YASSIN HAS ACTED IMPROPERLY.
CONTRACT HAS TO BE SIGNED BY AIR FORCE COMMANDER NOT FADHIL.
BELIEVE SUCCESSFUL SALE WOULD BE FINALISED AT £195,000. SUGGEST
HSA LTD DELAY REPLY TO FADHIL'S LETTER AND AWAIT FURTHER INFO.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MINTECH LONDON.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO MINTECH]

STOW DISTRIBUTION
N.EAST. DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.

Egerton says that all

neighbouring ports are concerned
against no objection.

Even if Iraq agree to take the
hunters, which he very much
doubts, they will not be delivered
for 2 years until he very much
of date.

Shoolley 4/6.

Re PMMM

22/6

RESTRICTED

Mr Fish (58)
Mr. P. P. P.
Are NED... still
contract with this?
9000!
W. P.
#6

Makin 331
Egerton 424

121

CYPHER

(39)

R129
Ami/Red

NED ✓

Defence Dept

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 3 JUL 1970
NEQ 10/4

CYPHER/CAT 'A'

ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 33

TO BAGHDAD
30 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR DEFENCE ATTACHE
FROM EIR1A2

NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT BEAGLE BULLDOG.

EIR1(B) MARKET INTELLIGENCE NEWSLETTER ADVISED THAT SCOTTISH AVIATION WILL FULFILL THE SWEDISH AIR FORCE ORDER FOR 58 BULLDOGS AND ARE SEEKING FURTHER ORDERS BASIC PRICE ABOUT £12000 EACH.

2. SCOTTISH SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMMENCE DELIVERIES TO CUSTOMERS OTHER THAN SWEDISH AIR FORCE IN SMALL QUANTITIES BY END-1971 AND BY MAY 1972 A PRODUCTION OUTPUT OF AROUND SEVEN PER MONTH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO FIRST TAKERS.

3. IN VIEW OF YOUR CONTINUED ADVISE THAT THE IRAQIS ARE INTERESTED IN UP TO FORTY BULLDOGS WE STRONGLY URGE PROMPT ORDERING BEFORE PRESENT DELIVERY SITUATION WORSENS.

4. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

Mr Stephens

Per Dept

head on there?

B. Mum
6/7

LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	

Am/Humb

2/7

NNNNNNNNNN

PH Brindley

the enter

light reconnaissance aircraft — The Firm of Beagle
has now been taken

Mini/Reck

NED ✓

Defence Dept

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

- 3 JUL 1970

NEQ 10/4

CYPHER/CAT 'A'

ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 33

TO BAGHDAD
30 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR DEFENCE ATTACHE
FROM EIR1A2

NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT BEAGLE BULLDOG.

EIR1(B) MARKET INTELLIGENCE NEWSLETTER ADVISED THAT SCOTTISH
AVIATION WILL FULFILL THE SWEDISH AIR FORCE ORDER FOR 58 BULLDOGS
AND ARE SEEKING FURTHER ORDERS BASIC PRICE ABOUT £12000 EACH.

2. SCOTTISH SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMMENCE DELIVERIES TO CUSTOMERS
OTHER THAN SWEDISH AIR FORCE IN SMALL QUANTITIES BY END-1971
AND BY MAY 1972 A PRODUCTION OUTPUT OF AROUND SEVEN PER MONTH
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO FIRST TAKERS.

3. IN VIEW OF YOUR CONTINUED ADVISE THAT THE IRAQIS ARE INTERESTED
IN UP TO FORTY BULLDOGS WE STRONGLY URGE PROMPT ORDERING BEFORE
PRESENT DELIVERY SITUATION WORSENS.

4. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

Mr Shepherd

Per Sec

What are there?

B. Mum
6/7

LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	

Mr Hill

2/7

NNNNNNNNNNNN

Mr Brindley

the enter

light reconnaissance aircraft Grubert The Firm of Beagle
have into legislation about six months ago - has now been taken
over by Scottish aviation.

Corbett
20 2/7

Export of Guided Missiles
by U.K. to
IRAQ

Xerox 2

~~SECRET~~

ADVANCE COPY

Hd. A.E.D.
Hd. Defence (2)

J.T.M.

DWF E 030/03
LKS NR 507/03

ROUTINE F.C.O.

GR 100

CYPHER CAT. A
ROUTINE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NO. STOW 33

TO MIN TECH LONDON
3 JUNE, 1970.

Reg & p.a.
June 4/1

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR EIR 2 SUBJECT RAPIER ⁴³ NEQ 10/3.
YOUR STOW 44 DATED 19 DECEMBER 1969 QUOTED RAPIER FOR
DELIVERY TO IRAQ AS THE MID TO LATE 1970'S, IF THEN.
HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THIS FORECAST?

IRAQIS ARE NEGOTIATING FOR CROTALE INSTEAD, BUT FRENCH
ARE ALSO STALLING ON DELIVERY DATES. IRAQI INTEREST
COULD STILL BE HELD IN RAPIER, IN SPITE OF DELAYED
DELIVERY, IF RAPIER WERE NOT RESTRICTED TO VISUAL OPERATION
ONLY. GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE ON PROGRESS OF RAPIER'S RADAR
INCLUDING FORECAST OF PRODUCTION DATE IF ANY.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MIN TECH LONDON

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 5 JUN 1970
NEQ 10/4

NNNN

CYPHER CAT. A
ROUTINE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NO. STOW 33

CONFIDENTIAL

TO MIN TECH LONDON
3 JUNE, 1970.

NEQ 10/10

in Egeron

W 6

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR EIR 2 SUBJECT RAPIER.

YOUR STOW 44 DATED 19 DECEMBER 1969 QUOTED RAPIER FOR
DELIVERY TO IRAQ AS THE MID TO LATE 1970'S, IF THEN.
HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THIS FORECAST?

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COULD STILL BE HELD IN RAPIER, IN SPITE OF DELAYED
DELIVERY, IF RAPIER WERE NOT RESTRICTED TO VISUAL OPERATION
ONLY. GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE ON PROGRESS OF RAPIER'S RADAR
INCLUDING FORECAST OF PRODUCTION DATE IF ANY.

*No change, presumably,
of getting authority
to sell Rapien
to Iraq?*

*Should we not
therefore discourage
Baghdad?*

JS

3.6.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MIN TECH LONDON

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

/SENT TO MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION
NR. EASTERN DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.

*Spoken to
Mr Benjamin
EIR 2 will
put a polite
damper on
Baghdad, in
a tel.*

NEQ 10/10

①

Mr. T. P. P. R. S. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

St. Egeron

5/6

②

Mr. Mackinson, for Com. min. file

③

Back to me.

NNNNN

Copy.

NEP 10/4

(4)

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL (P) AM NO 440

18 JUNE 1970

ACTION

ON

NEP 10/1

but

reply

on this

file?

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 440
DATED 18 JUNE 1970 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO
TEHERAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM 525

RAPIER FOR IRAN.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THIS EARLY REPLY.

2. AS REGARDS THE LINE PRESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5, I AM LESS CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT IT WILL CUT LITTLE ICEE THAN BY THE LIKELIHOOD THAT POINT (E) MAY BOOMERANG - PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCCT-ION WITH POINTS (A) AND (B). (AN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN (A) IS PRECISELY WHAT THE IRAQIS WANT THEMSELVES, AND THEY WILL HARDLY BE CONSOLED BY POINT (B) SINCE THEY TOO BEGAN SHOWING AN INTEREST IN IT OVER 18 MONTHS AGO BUT HAVE STEADILY RECEIVED A BRUSH-OFF). SEE ESPECIALLY MINTECH TEL NO STOW.44 OF 19 DECEMBER TO BAGHDAD, INSTRUCTING US TO DIVERT IRAQI ATTENTION TO OBSOLESCENT EQUIPMENT IN WHICH THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED.
3. THE IMPLICATION OF POINT (E) IS THAT THERE ARE NO LONGER SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO SUPPLYING RAPIER TO IRAQ AND IF WE USE THE FORMULA CONCERNED THEY MAY WELL SAY 'VERY WELL, BUT IN THAT CASE LET US GET DOWN TO BUSINESS STRAIGHT AWAY. KINDLY BEGIN BY LETTING US HAVE FULL TECHNICAL DETAILS WHICH YOU HAVE REFUSED TO PROVIDE EVER SINCE WE ASKED FOR THEM 18 MONTHS AGO'. WHAT DO WE THEN REPLY?
4. WITHDRAWAL OF SECURITY OBJECTIONS WOULD INDEED SEEM LOGICAL ONCE A DEAL WITH IRAN HAS BEEN CONCLUDED, BUT I SHOULD BE GLAD OF CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT BEFORE WE EXPOSE OURSELVES TO THE EXPECTED COMEBACK.

/F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

see f (3)

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

A.C.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO TEHERAN.

TELETYPE UNIT

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

FILES

GUIDANCE DEPT

N.E.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

MOD INT

IRAN FOR IRAN

YOUR TELEGRAM 2251

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THIS EARLY REPLY.

2. AS REGARDS THE LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1, I AM CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT IT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE THAN BY THE

ILLUSTRATION THAT POINT (C) MAY BECONVING - PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION

WITH THE FACT THAT THE LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1, I AM CONCERNED

BY THE FACT THAT IT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE THAN BY THE ILLUSTRATION

THAT POINT (C) MAY BECONVING - PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH

THE FACT THAT THE LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1, I AM CONCERNED

BY THE FACT THAT IT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE THAN BY THE ILLUSTRATION

THAT POINT (C) MAY BECONVING - PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH

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THAT POINT (C) MAY BECONVING - PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH

THE FACT THAT THE LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1, I AM CONCERNED

CONFIDENTIAL

42

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 546

TO BAGHDAD
19 JUNE 1970
(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 546 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO TEHRAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM 440 : RAPIER.

IF THE IRAQIS RAISE RAPIER FOR IRAN AND IF YOU FEEL THAT, IN THIS
CONTEXT, POINT (E) OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO. 525 WOULD
BE UNHELPFUL YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DISREGARD IT.

2. RAPIER FOR IRAQ: THE INTENTION OF POINT (E) WAS NOT (REPEAT)
NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE ARE, NO LONGER, SECURITY
OBJECTIONS TO SUPPLYING RAPIER TO IRAQ. THESE AND THE OTHER
OBJECTIONS AS STATED IN MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TELEGRAM STOW
NO. 44 OF 1969 STILL APPLY, AS DO THE DELIVERY DATES GIVEN FOR
IRAQ. WE INTENDED, IN MAKING POINT (E), TO ENABLE YOU TO REMIND
(IF NECESSARY) THE IRAQIS THAT ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT BE SLOW IN
PRODUCING RAPIER FOR IRAQ THE SAME DILATORINESS APPLIES TO THE
FRENCH, (IRAQ'S BEST FRIENDS IN THE WEST), AS FAR AS CROTALE WAS
CONCERNED (YOUR STOW NO. 33).

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
GUIDANCE D.
ARABIAN D.
DEFENCE D.
MOD (INT)

COPIES TO:

MR. FRITH
MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
EIR 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 22 JUN 1970
NEQ 10/14

as PAM
22/6

(Copy to File NEP 10/1)

Copy on NEP 10/1

43

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Defence
~~NEC~~

OO BAGHDAD

GROUPS 80A

1 Xerox

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW U/N

TO BAGHDAD

17 JULY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

FROM EIR 1(A)2.

HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
20 JUL 1970
NEQ 10/4

FOLLOWING FROM MURPHY OF H.S.A. LTD.

WHEN I HAD RECENT MEETING DEFENCE MINISTER AND CHIEFS STAFF
THEY STATED H.S.A. WOULD BE ADVISED YES OR NO TO MY LAST
PROPOSALS IN SEVEN TO TEN DAYS AND ADVICE WOULD PROBABLY BE
GIVEN THROUGH YOU.

IN VIEW OF DELAY IN ADVICE SUGGEST YOU SEE AIR FORCE COMMANDER
AND REQUEST WHEN ADVICE CAN BE EXPECTED AS H.S.A. UNDER PRESSURE
FOR PROPOSALS FROM OTHER CUSTOMERS AND IT IS INCREASINGLY
DIFFICULT TO RESERVE THE AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

DOUGLAS-HOME

Reg. La

Mum

18/7

LAST	
REF	
SENT	
REP	

NNNN

Mr Egerton b(43)

I spoke (in the absence of Benjamin) to Mr Sheen of Min. Tech.

2. Benjamin met Murphy of H. S. A yesterday. Murphy is confident that the deal will still go through and that only Iraq ^{bureaucratic} hesitations are holding up the decision to buy.

3. No other ^{customer} customer has made a firm bid for the Hunters but they will go to the first firm offer. The Iraqi hunters as the intention of

[below] — Stan O/N of 17 July was to remind them of this. This is legitimate commercial tactics.

Mr Inpp (524) —

I asked Mr

PMH 23/7

Mr. Knichcliffe for a sitrep
on hunters for Iraq before
the weekend, so that we
shall be prepared with the
facts when HMA Baghdad
complains about the possible
offer of Chieftains to Iran. (The
AEL to Tehran warning Sir D.
Wright of the Sales Team's
arrival on 25 July was copied
saving for information to
Baghdad).

J. E. F. S. M. T. M.

24/7

P.A. Jm
24/7

NEQ1014

DRAFT *CABLE / SAVINGRAM

FOR O.S.(Tels)2 USE ONLY

Date &
T.O.D.

30 JUL 1970.

Serial No.

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*No objection to teleprinter if available

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(Name)

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Branch

Building

Room

Ext.

Date

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Signed

Rank

Branch

Date

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INFORMATION COPIES TO :-

AS/EIR1
NEAR EASTERN DEPT. FCO
DEFENCE DEPT. FCO

File No. AP/13/01

†Priority marking: IMMEDIATE

TO: BAGHDAD

FOR: AIR ATTACHE

FROM: EIR.1(a)2 MINTECH

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

SUBJECT: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ
YOUR STOW 49 REFERS. — No Copy received
MURPHY OF H.S.A. GRATEFUL FOR
YOUR ASSISTANCE AND AGREES YOUR
SUGGESTION TO AIR FORCE COMMANDER
THAT I.A.F. SHOULD MAKE AN APPROACH
TO H.S.A. FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE
FINANCIAL PROPOSAL.

SOME SMALL IMPROVEMENTS
COULD BE MADE BUT DESIRABLE
FROM THE NEGOTIATION POINT OF
VIEW THAT I.A.F. SAY WHAT
FINANCE THEY CAN ARRANGE AND
H.S.A. WILL THEN SAY IF THIS IS
ACCEPTABLE.

ALSO ADVISE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER THAT H.S.A. HAVE
MADE RESERVATION FOR HIM AT
THE ROYAL GARDEN HOTEL FROM
6 TO 14 SEPTEMBER.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

(25)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 3 AUG 1970 NE Q 1014

IMMEDIATE STOW UNNUMBERED SENT 31.7.70

TO: BAGHDAD
FOR: AIR ATTACHE

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: NER1A2 NINTEN

SUBJECT: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

YOUR STOW 49 REFERS. — N.R.

MURPHY OF NSA GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE AND AGREES YOUR SUGGESTION TO AIR FORCE COMMANDER THAT IAF SHOULD MAKE AN APPROACH TO NSA FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL PROPOSAL.

SOME SMALL IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE MADE BUT DESIRABLE FROM THE NEGOTIATION POINT OF VIEW THAT IAF SAY WHAT FINANCE THEY CAN ARRANGE AND NSA WILL THEN SAY IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE.

ALSO ADVISE AIR FORCE COMMANDER THAT NSA HAVE MADE RESERVATION FOR HIM AT THE ROYAL GARDEN HOTEL FROM 6 TO 14 SEPTEMBER.

ORIG:- NER1A2

INFO:- AS/NER 1

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT - FCO

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT - FCO

FILE NO:- AP/13/01

Reg. No.
PMM
1/8.

CYPHER

46

Had Defence
Had NEQ

NO DISTRIBUTION

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 5 AUG 1970

NEQ 10/4.

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NO STOW 35

TO BAGHDAD

4 AUGUST 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR1(A)2 MINTECH.

SUBJECT: HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

OUR STOW UNNUMBERED OF 30 JULY REFERS. FOLLOWING FURTHER
ADVICE IS FROM MURPHY OF H.S.A.

IN PARTICULAR CHANGES MIGHT BE ACCEPTED IN RE-ARRANGEMENT OF
PAYMENT OF DEPOSIT ALSO PERHAPS LIMITED CREDIT. THEREFORE
IAF MAY WISH TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL ON THOSE LINES.

DOUGLAS-HOME

Rg. E.K.

mm

578

DATE	
REF	
NEXT	
BY	

RESTRICTED

AIR ATTACHÉ,
BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

114
47

AA/604/3

FCO (Near East Dept)
King Charles St
LONDON SW1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 AUG 1970 NEQ 10/4

10 August 1970

FINANCING OF IRAQI PURCHASE OF HUNTER AIRCRAFT

1. For several months now, the Iraqi Air Force have been negotiating with the Hawker Siddeley Aviation Company for the purchase of 16 refurbished Hunter aircraft. Together with various extras, the cost per aircraft and set is around £205,000, so the total value of the order is approximately £3¼ million.
2. The problem has been that the Iraqi Air Force have no funds available in this year's budget and at one stage, the deal was virtually called off. However, at the eleventh hour, the Air Force Commander, who has constantly emphasised that the IAF definitely want the aircraft and only needed to find a way of paying for them, called in the Air Attache and asked whether it would be acceptable to pay for the Hunters in sulphur.
3. He said that if it could be established in principle that this might be acceptable, the details of sulphur price etc could be worked out later. The only information available at the moment is that the sulphur would originate from the new Mosul mine and would be available in September or October 1971. It seems that, failing such an agreement, the Hunter deal would have to be called off.
4. It would be appreciated if an answer could be given by telegram.

[Signature]
H HARRISON
Wing Commander

Copies to:

Board of Trade (Mr. B.E. Bellamy, C.R.E.D.)
Mintech (EIR 1(A))

P.S. This letter has been composed in great haste to catch a bag. It has been seen by the Ambassador.

Mr. [Signature] *Commodore [Signature]* 17/8.

Mr. [Signature] (2/8) *Mintech* (The selling minutes) *are* *merely* *the* *rough* *idea* *here.* *It* *seems* *a* *very* *odd* *suggestion!*

RESTRICTED

the *note*

[Signature]
14/8

IMMEDIATE STOW 36 SENT 19.8.70

TO: BAGHDAD
FOR: AIR ATTACHE
FROM: EIR1A2 MINTECH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT:- HUNTERS FOR IRAQ.

YOUR LETTER AA/604/3 TO FCO OF 10 AUGUST.

HSA INTERESTED AND [REDACTED] CONSIDERING PROPOSAL BUT REQUIRE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO ARRIVE AT REASONABLE FIRST ASSESSMENT.

A SPECIFICATION OF SULPHUR

B LOWEST PRICE I E RATE PER TON (PRICE TO INCLUDE FOB).

C DELIVERY TIMESCALE FOR CONSIGNMENTS.

D IS A 30% CASH 70% COMMODITY ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE?

E WHAT FORM OF GUARANTEE OF SHIPMENT WOULD BE GIVEN?

THERE IS NO HMG OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE.

ORIG:- EIR1A2

INFO:- AS/EIR 1

Near Eastern Department - FCO

BOARD OF TRADE (CRED - Mr. B. E. BELLAMY

FILE NO:- AP/13/01

B.U. in 28/8. PNM 218
Commodity Dept
(Mr. Storn) is unhappy
Mr. Hatchwell
has you pl
find out
20/8. why?

Mr. T. H.

Rather unfortunately Hunters
are taking this offer to
pay to Hunters in sulphur
reimbursement!

now
by on 6/9.

PNM
28/8

PNM Hatchwell

20/8.

49

IMMEDIATE STOW UNNUMBERED SENT 3.9.70

TO: BAGHDAD
FOR: AIR ATTACHE
FROM: KIR 1A MINTEN

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 7 SEP 1970
NEQ 10/4

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR STOW 51 AND STOW 53 H S A ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING FOR POSSIBLE LARGE SALE OF HUNTERS WHICH WOULD TAKE UP MOST IF NOT ALL OF THOSE AVAILABLE. THEY WISH HOWEVER TO KEEP DOOR OPEN PRO TEM TO IRAQ PROSPECT RATHER THAN CONTINUE CORRESPONDENCE AT THIS STAGE. H S A WOULD PREFER AIR ATTACHE TO CONTACT THEM AT FARNBOROUGH FOR FULL DISCUSSION.

ORIG:- KIR 1A

INFO:- AS/KIR 1

Near Eastern Department - YCO

FILE NO:- AP/13/01

Reg. 6.

PM

7/9

istry No.
TMENT

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Despatched

CYPRER

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

14 SEP 1970

NEQ 10/4

TOP SECRET
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

Flash
Immediate
Priority
Routine

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair

Code

Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

telegram No.

And to

FOR:

FROM:

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

Draft Telegram to:

BAGHDAD

No. STOW. 37

(Date) 11-9-70

And to: 11/9

Repeat to:

Saving to:

O.S. (TELS) 2

Date

Distribution

Copies to

11-9-70

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
PLEASE DESPATCH THIS TELEGRAM

ALL - 6050545

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

11/5/70

14 301

11/9/70

EXAMINED AT
SIGNATURE

(C)

REALISE THIS MAY BE

DIRECTLY BUT IRAQIS

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

C) REALISE THIS MAY BE
DIFFICULT BUT IRAQIS
SHOULD BE TOLD THAT
HSA ARE EXAMINING
CLOSELY ASPECTS OF THE
SUGGESTED SULPHUR
EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENT
AND WILL CONTINUE

/dialogue

TO: _____

FOR: _____

FROM: _____

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

DIALOGUE DIRECTLY THEY
ARE READY.

(D) FURTHER HAZARDOUS ASPECT
IS INDICATION THAT MORE
HUNTERS COULD BECOME
AVAILABLE BUT AGAIN
NOTHING DEFINITE AT
PRESENT

(E) GRATEFUL THEREFORE
IF YOU COULD STAND
IRAQIS OFF FOR THE
PERIOD MENTIONED WHILST
DOING YOUR BEST TO
KEEP THE ASPECT
OPEN.

SHEEN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NO DISTRIBUTION

(51)
N. E. Dept

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
23 SEP 1970

NEQ 10/4

[Mintech / Defence]

Ref & M

23/9

CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELEGRAM NO STOW 38

TO BAGHDAD
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 211735Z.

YOUR STOW 55. HUNTERS.

SULPHUR SPECIFICATION UNDER CONSIDERATION BY HAWKERS AND ASSOCIATES.

UNLIKELY TO BE ANY POSITIVE CONCLUSION FOR A WEEK OR TWO.

2. H.S.A. ASSURE US HOWEVER THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT VERY POSSIBLE
AND GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PASS THIS TO IRAQIS AS PART OF DELAYING
ACTION.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/4

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELNO STOW 55

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR STOW 37 : HUNTERS.

WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR PARA (E) AND WOULD BE
 GRATEFUL FOR INITIAL RESULTS OF HSA'S ENQUIRIES INTO POSSIBLE
 SULPHUR DEAL. SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE VOLUNTEERED
 TO THE IRAQIS BUT MIGHT PROVE USEFUL IN FIGHTING A DELAYING ACTION.
 FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO MINTECH.

MR. HAWLEY

[SENT TO MINTECH]

STOW DISTRIBUTION
 N.E.D.

The background is as f.50,
 but Mr Egerton will not
 wish to deal with this now
 (B/pe 24/10/70 to SLE.

noted 24/9/70
 PK

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr H.

What is
 posn now
 on Hunters
 deal, pl?

Mr Egerton

Regis.

Could I be
 to file re. RMM 1/14

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

M. E. ...
line

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

than (53)

TELNO STOW 56

6 OCTOBER 1970

ugrb.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - OCT 9 1970 NEQ 10/3
--

[Signature]

7/0

D T G 060931Z

YOUR STOW 38 DATED 21 SEP. HUNTERS.

DA CALLED ON COMMANDER IAF ON 6 OCTOBER TO KEEP HIM IN PLAY ON HUNTERS. DA EXPLAINED THAT SULPHUR DEAL WAS SOMETHING NEW FOR COMPANY WHICH REQUIRED DETAILED EXAMINATION AND THAT ALTHOUGH INITIAL REACTIONS WERE HOPEFUL, FINAL RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR AT LEAST 2 - 3 WEEKS. COMMANDER SAID HE WELCOMED THE DELAY AS HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING AN ANSWER FROM THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE AND FINANCE ON THE CASH ELEMENT OF THE DEAL. SO FAR HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT NO CASH HAD BEEN BUDGETED FOR THE DEAL AND NONE WAS FORTHCOMING. HE HAD THEN ASKED WHETHER THEY WOULD RE-CONSIDER AND SAY WHAT MIGHT BE PAID OVER A PERIOD OF EXTENDED CREDIT. HE ANTICIPATED NO IMMEDIATE REPLY. GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER SITREP ON HAWKER SIDDELEY'S POSITION TOWARDS END OF OCTOBER.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO MINTECH.

MR. HAWLEY

[SENT TO MINTECH]

STOW DISTRIBUTION
ARAB DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.

*Action: EIR. 1(A) 2
US/EIR
AS/EIR. 1.*

*NEAR EASTERN DEPT.
File AP/13/01*

CONFIDENTIAL

-RR- BAGHDAD

GPS 130

CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE MINTECH
TELEGRAM NO STOW 40

TO BAGHDAD
8 OCTOBER

CONFIDENTIAL 081120Z

FOR AIR ATTACHE FROM EIR2C2 MINTECH. GCI SIMULATOR.

1. UNDERSTAND SOLARTRON ARE HOPING TO SELL SIMULATOR TO IAF.
IN ORDER TO ASSIST SALE WE ARE ASKED TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING
IRAQ OFFICERS FOR BASIC RAF FIGHTER CONTROL COURSE.

2. UNLIKELY TO BE PLACES AVAILABLE BEFORE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR.
AS COURSE IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL LIKELY TO BE SECURITY PROBLEMS
EVEN IF VACANCIES.

3. IN ORDER TO HELP MAKE CASE TO PUT TO DEPARTMENTS GRATEFUL FOR
YOUR VIEWS ON PROSPECTS OF SOLARTRON MAKING SALE AND ALSO ON
WIDER ISSUE OF AIR DEFENCE RADAR REQUIREMENTS. IRAQ VISITORS IN
UK ON SIMULATOR AT PRESENT ALSO TALKING TO PLESSEY ON AR5 RADAR.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

54
Mintech
Defence
R.F.D.

Reg
PMM

1110

NO DISTRIBUTION

NEQ 10/4

RESTRICTED

L.H.30DT

Please enter - 18/11/70



AVIATION SUPPLY
MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

(55)

EIR 2b2, Room 204,

Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex


Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 141

Our reference: HU/151/011

Your reference:

13/11 November, 1970

Mr S Macpherson
Defence Dept.
FCO
Downing Street



*now po
PMM
29/11*

Dear *Mr Macpherson*,
BLOWPIPE TO IRAQ

Despite the efforts of our Embassy in Bagdad on behalf of Tigercat, Iraqi interest in Blowpipe persists.

2 The Iraqi party was apparently very impressed with Blowpipe at SBAC Farnborough, and their Military Attaché in London has now asked if Blowpipe will be available to them, and if so, at what price, and in which timescale.

3 Shorts have warned them that Blowpipe will not be available to them before 1975, if at all, but they seem content to join a waiting list.

4 Approval to supply Blowpipe to Iraq was refused in December, 1968. RMISC approval is concurrently being sought for release of column 4 Confidential information.

(Release of Mil information Sub Committee)

*Review over plane (see para 4) + re-valuation
PMM
18/11*

RESTRICTED

5. I should be grateful if AWP could give an indication of whether or not Shorts would be wasting their time fostering Iraqi interest because eventual supply, in the timescale mentioned above, would not be approved.

6. This letter is copied to Mr J B Wade (DS13) for MOD agreement, and to all other members of AWP for information.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'H Goodall'.

H Goodall, Miss

Copies for information:

Mr R L L Facer
Head of DS13
MOD Main Building

Mr O G E Dickson
Treasury

Miss N Betteridge
Dept. of Trade & Industry
1 Victoria Street

Mr R W Browne
Sales 1, MOD
36 Whitehall

Mr A B Fayle
DS13, MOD
Main Building

Mr C Bailey)
Mr J Thexton) MAS

Miss K E Wood
DS8, MOD
Main Building

Mrs B Cole
Sales 2, MOD
36 Whitehall

Mrs D E J Brooke
DI73, MOD
Metrople Building

Wg Cdr A B Stinchcombe
DPS (C Team)

P.O. the
minutes

WSS

Reference.....

Mr. Skinner:

Blowpipe - Iraq.

29/12

This 'project' is clearly dead in view of the RMZ Sub-Committee's final decision (folio 1 of File DT 9/354/1, below).

2. Nevertheless I suppose we should send a reply to Miss Goodall, if only to notify all members of the AWP. In a former case, she said they like to have the FCO approval (or otherwise) on record, but I have been non-committal in the draft reply, below. Do you think it will suffice?

21/12

Mr. Skinner spoke. Agreed no letter to Miss Goodall is necessary as this would only 'rub salt in the wound'. The RMZ decision to refuse Blowpipe to Iraq is sufficient & the news will filter through to the AWP Members.
22/12.

Mr. Skinner

Please see Mr Hunchcliff's two minutes on the separate files below, & also mine of 23 November.

2. Do you think I should give an interim reply to Miss Goodall (Yoko SS) at this stage, or wait until she gives us the MOD reply?

24/11

I have informed MOD that we have no objection on political grounds to the release of "Cobalt" Blompi information to Gray. The action taken is concluded on DT-9/359/1. I am given to understand that, in fact, there will be security questions, which means that the information will not be released which, in turn, means that we can probably forget about future sales

24/11

Mr M. P. [unclear] 23/4
Ref. Dent

Blow pipe to 1.000

FOLD

(55)

I do not fully understand what, in the
 light of Para. 4, Miss Goodall wants?!

There could be no point in entering
 Iraqi interest if eventual supply would
 not be offered!

FCO would have no objection to
 Confidential information being released but
 this is not a matter for the FCO - we would
 go along with MOO's recurring objections
 but shamed in 1968 (See below (4) on NSC 10/3
 of 1968/69 attached)

We will make no attempt to the
 supply of Blowpipe to Iraq when as
 if a firm order is placed - being increased
 or substantial timescales does not amount
 to an order. Anyhow let us see
 what the MOO recently would say before

Let's take these as only birth.

PMH

19/X1

I have spoken to Miss Goodall today and she has agreed to let me know the HQ's reply as soon as it is received. I understand our file on "Release of Information to Iraq" is now with Mr. Henschel, presumably pending a reply to paragraph 4 of Miss Goodall's letter. I have marked file for HQ on 20 December for review if the above replies are not received sooner.

Ch. 23/11

Mr M. Pleyton

Please correct your minutes class with Mr Skinner's minutes on 17/11. HQ DT9/359/1. "Release of Military Information to Iraq". As for the release, information to "Confidential" level: concerned or less on this does not imply HMG agrees to a rule, at this stage, NED would have no objection.

PMH

24/11

Suisse

BERNE CONFIRME L'ACHAT DE TRENTÉ AVIONS BRITANNIQUES

Berne (A.F.P.). — Le Conseil fédéral (gouvernement helvétique) a décidé le 18 novembre, au cours de sa réunion hebdomadaire, l'acquisition en Grande-Bretagne de trente avions de combat Hunter. (*le Monde* du 18 novembre).

Toutefois, les fonds nécessaires à cet achat devront encore être accordés par le Parlement fédéral, sans doute au mois de juin, au moment de la discussion du budget militaire. On croit savoir à Berne que le Conseil fédéral demanderait un crédit de 110 millions de francs suisses (l'équivalent de 140 millions de francs français), correspondant à la fois au coût des avions et à leur modernisation. En effet, les appareils Hunter seront achetés d'occasion et modernisés par le constructeur britannique Hawker-Siddeley.

Quant à la coopération avec la Grande-Bretagne, que de s'enliser dans le libéralisme.

None 1 rank
for now

Nelegra
Hawker Siddeley

1 rank for now

58

LINE: STOW 43 SENT 08 1630 DECEMBER

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM: EIR 1A2, AVSUPP, CASTLEWOOD HOUSE, LONDON

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT:- SEA KING FOR IRAQ.

YOUR STOW 42 REFERS.

**WESTLANDS WILL SEND REPRESENTATIVE TO BAGHDAD BUT PROBABLY NOT
BEFORE FIRST WEEK IN JANUARY.**

FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE NOTIFIED NEARER TIME.

ORIG:- EIR 1A2

INFO:- AS/EIR 1

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT FCO

FILE NO:- AP/32/021

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 15 DEC 1978
NEQ 10/4

Ps
PMM

17/12

LAST PAPER

RR BAGHDAD

GPS 30

Defence
NEED
59

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE MINISTRY OF AVIATION SUPPLY

TELNO STOW 44

RESTRICTED 171500Z

SEA KING FOR IRAQ.

OUR STOW 43.

58

WEJES OF WESTLANDS PROVISIONALLY ARRANGING TO ARRIVE 4 JANUARY.
HE REQUESTS YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT MEETINGS CAN BE ARRANGED TO
DISCUSS HELICOPTER REQUIREMENT.

DOUGLAS-NONE

Leg 10

Phms

18/4

LAST PAPER

NNNN

UK considers Exporting Military Aircraft To Iraq To Lessen Latter's Reliance On Moscow; Iranian, Kuwaiti And Israeli Reactions Considered. Export Of Military Aircraft And Guided Missiles From UK To Iraq. 8 Feb. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1259. Newspaper Cutting, Photographs An. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476144/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=9b73d69e&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.